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ABSTRACT 
 
Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) upgrades are a vital research area for nuclear industry. 
Despite their performance benefits, deployment of digital I&C in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been 
limited. Digital I&C systems exhibit complex failure modes including common cause failures (CCFs) 
which can be difficult to identify. This paper describes the development of a redundancy-guided application 
of the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the hazard analysis 
of digital I&C in advanced NPPs. The resulting Redundancy-guided System-theoretic Hazard Analysis 
(RESHA) is applied for the case study of a representative state-of-the-art digital reactor trip system. The 
analysis qualitatively and systematically identifies the most critical CCFs and other hazards of digital I&C 
systems. Ultimately, RESHA can help researchers make informed decisions for how, and to what degree, 
defensive measures such as redundancy, diversity, and defense-in-depth can be used to mitigate or eliminate 
the potential hazards of digital I&C systems.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AOO anticipated operational occurrence 
BP bistable processor 
CCF common cause failure 
CS control structure 
D3 diversity and defense-in-depth 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
DPS diverse protection system 
EPRI Electric Power and Research Institute 
ESFAS engineered safety feature actuation system 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FT fault tree 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZCADS Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems 
I&C instrumentation and control 
INL Idaho National Laboratory 
LC logic cabinet 
LCL local coincidence logic 
LP logic processor 
MCR main control room 
NPP nuclear power plant 
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
RESHA Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis 
RPS reactor protection system 
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RSR remote shutdown room 
RTB reactor trip breaker 
RTS reactor trip system 
SOI system of interest 
SP selective processor 
SPOF single point of failure 
ST shunt  
STPA Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis 
UCA unsafe control action 
UV undervoltage  
  
  
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Digital upgrades and plant modernization efforts offer the foremost path to performance and cost 
improvements of nuclear power plants (NPPs) [1]. Despite decades of experience with analog systems, the 
technical challenges associated with their continued use (e.g., signal drift, high maintenance costs, 
obsolescence, and lack of industrial suppliers) have caused the nuclear industry to move toward digital 
instrumentation and control (I&C) in favor of integrated circuitry and the modern microcontroller [2] [3]. 
Compared with analog, digital I&C systems offer significant advantages in the areas of monitoring, 
processing, testing, and maintenance [2] [4]. Notwithstanding the immediate attraction, the nuclear industry 
has been slow to adopt safety rated digital I&C because each new design must be shown to maintain or 
improve the status quo by means of a risk assessment [3]. Though many of the concepts for the risk 
assessment of analog systems carry over, digital I&C systems present unique challenges. In 1997, the 
National Research Council detailed several technical challenges for the implementation of digital I&C 
systems. Those relating specifically to the present work are: (1) the system aspects of digital systems; (2) 
the potential for software-based common cause failures (CCFs); and (3) the need for a risk assessment 
method tailored to digital I&C systems [3].  
 
The system aspects of digital I&C involve issues that extend beyond individual components and even 
beyond the function of the system itself. The challenge of the system aspects is discussed in NUREG/CR-
6901. Digital systems exhibit two types of interactions—Type 1: the interactions of a digital I&C system 
(and/or its components) with a controlled process (e.g., NPP); and Type 2: the interactions of a digital I&C 
system (and/or its components) with itself and/or other digital systems and components [5]. Kirschenbaum 
et al. provide a useful summary of these concerns in their own work in the investigation of digital systems 
[6]. Additionally, NUREG/CR-6734 Vol.1 & Vol.2 provide a list of guidelines for software systems 
requirements and an expansive list of real failure examples relating to software [7] [8]. A chief concern for 
software failures are those effecting common systems or software (i.e., CCFs).  
 
Common or redundant components are often utilized as a backup to ensure system reliability. However, 
the improper application of redundant features can leave a system vulnerable to CCFs, which arise from 
the malfunction of two or more components, or functions, due to a single failure source [1] [9]. In order to 
make redundancy designs effective, diversity is employed, providing an alternative technology, method, 
technique, or means to achieve a desired result [10]. The diverse protection helps to eliminate the common 
features necessary for a CCF. NUREG/CR-5485 provides general guidance for modeling CCFs in risk 
assessments [11]. While, NUREG/CR-6303 is written in the context of software systems and provides 
guidance for the application of diversity to minimize CCFs [12]. These reports provide a basis for dealing 
with CCFs. There need remains to identify the most significant CCFs in order to focus the application of 
diversity in design. 
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While diversity in analog I&C systems is a standard practice, its effectiveness for digital I&C systems 
remains a topic of concern. The use of digital technologies may “increase the potential for CCF 
vulnerabilities because of the introduction of undetected systematic faults” [13].  These systematic failures 
(i.e. failures inherent to design specifications and systems interactions [14]) in the software may result from, 
“(1) errors in the requirement specification, (2) inadequate provisions to account for design limits (e.g., 
environmental stress), or (3) technical faults incorporated in the internal system (or architectural) design or 
implementation” [13]. Knight and Leveson indicate that independently developed software may not 
necessarily fail independently [15]. These sources highlight the importance of properly defined software 
requirements to help eliminate system failures. To effectively determine software requirements, one must 
identify system vulnerabilities. As summarized by Arndt and Kuritzky in 2011, the identification and 
modeling of software failure modes remains the most challenging aspect of risk analysis for digital I&C 
systems [16]. Once system vulnerabilities have been identified, NUREG/CR-6303 and NUREG/KM-0009 
can provide approaches on how to limit them [12] [17]. More recently, NUREG/CR-7007 was written to 
determine “how much diversity is enough” [18]. 
 
The implementation of digital I&C upgrades depends on risk assessment methods which can 
appropriately handle the unique aspects and CCFs of digital systems. A proper risk assessment relies on 
both qualitative and quantitative techniques [11]. In 1997, The National Research Council indicated concern 
within the software community whether failure rate probabilities or quantification is even appropriate for 
software [3]. Reliability assessments of digital systems have remained a significant focus in the literature; 
NUREG/CR-6901, NUREG/CR-6942, and NUREG/CR-6985 are just a few examples [5] [19] [20]. The 
hazard analysis performed in this work provides a technical basis for a reliability analysis by identifying 
crucial failure modes and qualitatively determining their effects on system vulnerability. 
 
To support the transition from analog to digital I&C systems, Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has 
initiated a project under the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of 
Energy’s (DOE’s) Light Water Reactor Sustainability program to develop a risk assessment strategy for the 
design and use of digital I&C upgrades [21]. This effort aims to provide a process for the nuclear industry 
to systematically assess and evaluate the risks of advanced and highly redundant digital systems by 
answering three questions used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to define risk: “(1) What 
can go wrong? (2) How likely is it? (3) What are the consequences?” [22]. These questions are the 
foundation of the risk assessment strategy being developed by INL. Part 1 corresponds with the 
identification of hazards. Part 2 involves establishing the frequency or probability of the hazards (i.e., the 
reliability of the system). Part 3 focuses on evaluating the consequences of the hazards found and quantified 
from Parts 1 and 2. This paper details the hazard analysis of digital I&C systems with an emphasis on the 
identification of potential CCFs as Part 1 of the risk assessment strategy [21].  
 
This work provides recommendations for the management of risks and the development and 
deployment of advanced digital I&C technologies in the nuclear industry by meeting the following 
objectives: (1) provide a technical basis for the implementation of a reliability analysis by identifying 
crucial failure modes and qualitatively determining their effects on system vulnerability; (2) help utilities 
optimize the use of diversity attributes in a cost-effective manner; (3) help engineers efficiently make design 
and risk mitigation decisions by providing them a means to systematically identify the most critical CCFs 
and hazards of digital I&C systems.  
 
Section 2 of the paper provides detail regarding technical background and approach to a Redundancy-
guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA). Next, a detailed description of each step of RESHA 
is provided in Section 3. RESHA is then demonstrated in a case study hazard analysis of a digital reactor 
trip system in Section 4.  The results are discussed in Section 5, followed by a conclusion of the work in 
Section 6. 
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2. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND AND APPROACH  
 
Hazards can be understood as a state or condition that can lead to a loss of something of value to 
stakeholders [23]. Hazard analysis is defined as the process of examining a structure, system, or component 
in order to identify hazards and triggers of hazards with the goal of eliminating, mitigating or controlling 
them [24]. The 2013 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report on hazard analysis methods for digital 
I&C discusses common methods and indicates their respective strengths and weaknesses [25]. In order to 
successfully model digital I&C systems, the need exists to model both the hardware and software 
interactions of the system. Traditional methods such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) have been used to extensively to model analog systems. However, interactions 
between digital systems and controlled processes (i.e. Type 1 interactions) and the interactions between 
digital systems and their own components or other systems (i.e. Type 2 interactions) can result in failure 
modes or hazards that are difficult to discover using traditional methods [16]. Lessons learned from the 
NRC’s investigation of multiple analysis methods indicate that there “may not be one preferable method 
for modeling all digital systems” [16]. However, combinations of methods may prove beneficial. A recent 
advancement in hazard analysis, developed jointly by EPRI and Sandia National Laboratory, combines 
FTA and systems-theoretic process analysis (STPA) as a portion of their methodology of Hazard and 
Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) [26]. The current work incorporates this concept 
of combining FTA and STPA as part of the approach for RESHA. 
  
FTA is a conventional, top-down, risk assessment tool that is used to identify the faults that contribute 
to the failure of a selected top event, which may depend on combinations of multiple smaller contributors 
known as basic events. A key aspect of FTA is the determination of the “cut set,” which is collection of 
events that, when combined, will result in failure of the selected top event. There are often many variations 
of cut sets comprising of single or multiple events [27]. For a hazard analysis, the determination of the cut 
set is critical and can be done without probability, or failure rate, data [28]. FTA is the workhorse of the 
nuclear industry and has been used extensively to model control systems. 
 
STPA is an analysis method based on system theory that is used to capture the unsafe interactions 
between system components, in addition to component failures [23]. Its top-down analysis focuses on the 
identifying constraints on behavior and the interaction of components [29]. The main parts of STPA are 
focused on the construction of a control structure and the analysis of unsafe component interactions. The 
control structure highlights the controller interactions, while the analysis identifies necessary behavior 
constraints to reduce or eliminate hazards. Together FTA and STPA will be used to provide a clearer picture 
of the hazards in digital I&C systems as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. FTA and STPA combined for a full picture of I&C failures adapted from [21]. 
Though STPA may be applied at any stage of system design and review, it is ideally suited for early 
application in the design process before safety features have been incorporated into the design [23]. Then, 
as more details are incorporated, the STPA method is applied iteratively to further improve the design. 
However, even when fine detail about a system is known, the analysis may remain at a high level, relying 
on causal factor investigations to provide the detail of subcomponent failures and interactions. In other 
words, the details such as redundant subsystems or components are often ignored in all but the final part of 
STPA. Consequently, there isn’t a clear representation of how to apply STPA or create a control structure 
for a system containing multiple layers of redundancy. In a 2014 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
technical report, STPA is applied to an aircraft automatic braking system and redundant features are only 
mentioned in the context of causal factors [29]. In 2018, Rejzek and Hilbes replicated this idea for an 
application of STPA to nuclear related digital I&C systems. Their application stresses that the control 
structure only incorporate the functional aspects of the system, again leaving the details of redundancy for 
the context portion of STPA [30]. While this aspect of STPA does not appear to lessen its effectiveness, 
waiting to include the finer details of a system may hinder the identification of CCFs. As a possible 
consequence of this complication, STPA does not appear to be used specifically to identify and address 
CCFs in the context of digital I&C.  
 
In order to identify CCFs, including their relationship to characteristics not clearly featured in the 
standard STPA analyses, it is essential that STPA have a clear application process for highly redundant 
systems. For this particular application of STPA, all layers of a redundancy design should be incorporated 
clearly and early in the design analysis. It is proposed that reframing STPA in a redundancy-guided way, 
in combination with FTA, will provide a means to effectively identify the unique hazards, failure modes 
and CCFs associated with highly redundant safety-based digital I&C systems [31]. By following this 
approach, the triggers of the most significant hazards to advanced digital I&C systems can be identified and 
either mitigated or eliminated.  
 
3. REDUNDANCY-GUIDED SYSTEMS-THEORETIC HAZARD ANALYSIS 
 
RESHA includes seven steps that are illustrated in Figure 2. RESHA is not organized in a way to direct 
the initial concept and genesis of a control structure. Rather, the steps are arranged for the analysis of 
existing designs. RESHA is ideally suited for the analysis of designs that already have some redundancy 
features incorporated.   
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Figure 2: Steps to the redundancy-guided system-theoretic hazard analysis. 
 
STEP-1: Create a detailed representation of the system of interest (SOI). 
 
The purpose of STEP-1 is to establish a system sketch to serve as a blueprint for the hazard analysis. 
This is done by gathering system design information, including wiring, piping and instrumentation 
diagrams, existing logic diagrams, etc. The information is then used to create a system sketch, the main 
goal of which is to map out the processors, sensors, controllers, components, interactions, and connections 
of the system. The point of this step is not to necessarily fit everything into one diagram, but to gain a 
sufficient understanding of the system in order to complete the hazard analysis; the level of detail provided 
in this step lays out the foundation for the work.  
 
Digital I&C structures can be divided into three hierarchical levels: (1) divisions; (2) units; and (3) 
modules. Divisions typically fulfill a role of monitoring processes, systems, or functions redundantly with 
other divisions by relying on their subsystems of units and modules. Units perform specific tasks that are 
supported by the function processing capabilities of modules [28]. The system diagram should clearly 
display the flow of information between divisions, units, and modules. Emphasis should be placed to clearly 
illustrate the redundancy and diversity of the system in order to provide a basis for constructing the FT in 
STEP-2 and control structure in STEP-3. 
Several key points are considered for STEP-1: 
• STEP-1 emphasizes the boundary conditions and scope of the analysis. These should be clearly 
understood as they will be revisited in STEP-2 and STEP-3. 
• Though the RESHA has been developed to analyze digital systems, this system sketch should also 
include the hardware structural arrangement (i.e., the components of the system in addition to 
details collected for the digital structural arrangement).  
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• The level of detail included in a hazard analysis can extend beyond module level failures to the 
components and sensors that provide input to process modules. The level of detail to be included 
in the hazard analysis depends on the scope of the investigation. 
STEP-2: Develop a fault tree (FT) consisting of the hardware failures for a chosen function of the 
SOI. 
Having constructed a sketch of the digital system, a corresponding FT can be made. The main 
assumption for this step is that all software failures will be captured using STPA in STEP-3. Therefore, 
only hardware failures will be included in FT. The FT is created using the following 2-part process1 adapted 
from the NASA Handbook [27].  
STEP-2A: Define the boundary of the analysis (revisited from STEP-1). This includes selecting a top 
event and resolution for the analysis. Top events2 are based on the purpose of the SOI. The failure of the 
SOI’s most significant function is a priority event to be analyzed by the FT—a top event. STEP-3A may 
also be visited briefly to ensure the proper selection of top events. 
STEP-2B: Construct the FT. Starting from the top event, construction proceeds by determining the 
“necessary and sufficient immediate events” contributing to failure of the top event [27]. This process is 
repeated down the tree by analyzing each subsequent event step-by-step, ending with an event that can be 
resolved no further (either by way of fact, or by the discretion of the analyst) [27]. This event is known as 
a basic event. The failure of each event depends on a logical combination (e.g., “and,” “or,” and “n/m” 
functions) of basic events, which should be built into the FT based on the system diagram from STEP-1. 
The structure of the FT should capture the details of redundancy that will aid in the subsequent steps of the 
hazard analysis. In most cases, the highest level of redundancy will be associated with protecting the main 
function of the SOI. For instance, a system may have two or more divisions, independent and redundant in 
function, to ensure the reliability of that system. Redundancy also extends to the units and modules of 
digital systems, for which commonality becomes a possible source of CCF. The hardware CCFs should 
also be included in the FT. Software details will be added in STEP-3 of the RESHA. 
STEP-3: Determine unsafe control actions (UCAs) based on a redundancy-guided application of 
STPA. 
The main purpose of STEP-2 is to construct a FT that can be readily combined with software failure 
events which will be found using a redundancy-guided application of STPA here in STEP-3. According to 
the STPA Handbook there are four main parts to the STPA. The first two focus on the construction of a 
control structure, and the second two focus on the analysis of unsafe component interactions. The first three, 
shown in Figure 3, will be used in STEP-3. The fourth part of STPA is included later in STEP-7. A fully 
detailed description of the process and steps of STPA can be found in the STPA Handbook 2018 [23]. The 
process given here highlights the key parts directly applicable to RESHA. 
 
 
1 This process has been simplified to two parts and directed to the analysis of highly redundant digital I&C from the 
original eight-step FTA given in the NASA FTA Handbook [27]. 
2 There can be multiple top events for a single system with the FT for each new top event varying significantly. The 
number of FT to be analyzed will depend on the project scope. 
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Figure 3. The first three parts of STPA are used in STEP-3 of the RESHA. The details shown have been 
adapted from the STPA Handbook [23]. 
STEP-3A: Defining the purpose of the analysis. The SOI should be defined along with its losses, 
hazards, boundaries, and environments. The system diagram developed in STEP-1 should provide clear 
indication of the boundary, and environment. A loss is defined as: “something of value to stakeholders. 
Losses may include a loss of human life or human injury, property damage, environmental pollution, loss 
of mission, loss of reputation, loss or leak of sensitive information, or any other loss that is unacceptable to 
the stakeholders” [23]. Losses should be listed to provide direction for identifying hazards. System hazard 
is a state or set of conditions that, in a particular set of worst-case conditions, will lead to a loss [23]. These 
hazards pertain to the system as a whole and do not represent a complete hazard analysis.   
STEP-3B: Create a model of the control structure. This is done by referring to the system diagram from 
STEP 1 to identify, group, and organize the system based on its controllers, components and controlled 
process. The STPA Handbook promotes the idea of “zooming-in” to add system detail [23]. However, as 
mentioned previously, the typical application of STPA does not build multi-layered redundancy directly 
into the control structure. By reframing the standard STPA approach, complex and highly redundant digital 
systems can be broken down into more manageable portions. The redundancy-guided approach allows a 
straightforward creation of a multi-layer control structure which both captures the details of the SOI and 
provides an efficient way to identify CCFs. 
The first control structure should be based on the highest level of redundancy (e.g., divisional), followed 
by any sub-layers (e.g., unit and module-based3 redundancies). Each control structure layer is created with 
numbered control actions and feedback signals until a final, redundancy-guided, multi-layer control 
structure is created for the complete SOI, as shown in Figure 4. A table should be used to track each of the 
identified control actions.  
 
 
3 Creating a control structure for the internal structure of a module may not be required based on the 
assumed/desired model resolution and scope. 
Page 9 
 
 
Figure 4:Multi-layered control structure approach. The complete system is modeled using control 
structures identified and separated according to redundancy. The numbering system (XXnn.nn.nn) 
corresponds to DIVISIONunit.module.component. 
STEP-3C: Identify UCAs. A UCA is control action that, in a particular context and environmental 
conditions, will lead to a hazard [23]. When the control structure has been completed, the UCAs can be 
determined from the control action table created in STEP-3B and then compiled in a new table. The UCAs 
will be used to add software failures to the FT from STEP-2. For each control action identified, there are 
four categories of potential UCAs that may affect the behavior of the SOI. These categories are: 
1. Control action is not provided when it is needed. 
2. Control action is provided when it is not needed. 
3. Control action is provided when it is needed, but too early, too late, or in a wrong order. 
4. Control action lasts too long or stops too soon (only applicable to continuous control actions). 
Each UCA should take the following format for consistency [23]: 
𝑈𝐶𝐴 = [𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒] + [𝑈𝐶𝐴 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒] + [𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛] + [𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡] + [𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠] 
STEP-4 Construct an integrated FT by adding applicable UCAs as basic events. 
This step completes the FT started in STEP-2 by adding applicable UCAs from those found in STEP-
3. Applicable UCAs are selected based on their relation to the top event chosen in STEP-2. For example, 
control actions that are continuous, like those relating to category four above, are only applicable to top 
events requiring continuous control. Each UCA must be added to the FT as a single basic event. This should 
be placed in the FT by adding a software failure subtree where appropriate. This will provide a location to 
add software CCFs in STEP-5. Figure 5 provides an example of this structure. 
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Figure 5. Example FT format for incorporating software and hardware-based failures. 
STEP-5 Identify potential software CCFs based on duplicate or redundant UCAs within the FT. 
The identification of software CCFs depends on the software diversity of the digital system. As one of 
the guidelines for software, the NRC prescribes the use of diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) as, “the use 
of different programs designed and implemented by different development groups with different key 
personnel to accomplish the same safety goals-for example, using two separately designed programs to 
compute when a reactor should be tripped” [12]. The degree to which D3 is employed can limit the number 
or potential for CCFs in a control system. Before the identification of software CCFs, the level of system 
diversity in the SOI should be determined or expressly assumed to guide the classification of software 
CCFs. 
Each software failure can result from for one or more types of UCA; therefore, each component or 
processor has the potential for multiple software failure events. Additionally, when components share 
commonality in software or are complete duplications for the sake of redundancy, there is a potential for 
software CCFs. These CCFs can be grouped according to their hierarchy (i.e., divisions, units, and 
modules). A module can share a CCF with common modules of its own unit, with common modules of 
other units, or with common modules across divisions. The table of UCAs and the integrated FT can help 
identify the CCFs. Based on the research assumptions, the number of CCFs to be included in the final FT 
can be limited (e.g., to a single division or unit). However, the full set provides a useful tool to direct D3, 
improve the SOI, and mitigate the hazards of CCFs. Each selected CCF should be placed within the FT 
where appropriate, such as next to their single failure counterparts.  
STEP-6: Solve the FT for the minimal cut sets to determine potential single points of failure (SPOFs) 
in the design. 
FTs can be analyzed quantitatively or qualitatively [28]. RESHA relies on the qualitative analysis based 
purely on the logic of the FT, which identifies crucial failures (i.e., hazards) and provides the technical basis 
for the reliability (i.e., quantitative) analysis to performed in future work. The qualitative analysis of the FT 
should be conducted using an FTA software package which will evaluate the FT for minimal cut sets (i.e., 
a collection of basic events that, when combined, will result in failure of the top event). The number of 
basic events within each cut set (i.e., cut set order) varies depending on the SOI. For a qualitative analysis, 
the significance of each cut set is assumed to be dependent only on order; therefore, the fewer basic events 
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in the cut set, the more likely it will occur4. For this analysis, a first order cut set is known as a SPOF. Cut 
sets containing a CCF as their only basic event are also treated as a SPOF for the sake of this analysis.5 By 
evaluating the cut set list for SPOFs, designers can determine where and how the SOI is vulnerable and 
redesign it accordingly.  
The next step in the RESHA continues by evaluating the cut sets found in STEP-6. There will be 
instances where, due to the system design, there are not SPOFs to analyze. In such cases, the analysis should 
proceed with the next lowest order. The idea is to focus on the cut sets that are most critical based on the 
assumption that probabilities are irrelevant and higher order cut sets occur less frequently. The FT cut set 
list can also be modified by evaluating portions of the FT that are most concerning to designers, such as 
individual divisions or subsystems. By doing so, SPOF for subsystems may be found and addressed. 
STEP-7: Identify and provide guidance to eliminate triggers of critical failures in the design 
including, CCFs and SPOFs. 
The purpose of the previous six steps was to help efficiently identify the most significant hazards of the 
SOI. The intention of STEP-7 is to identify and eliminate the triggers or causal factors of the basic events 
(i.e., UCAs, CCFs, etc.) contained in the cut sets of the FT. The most significant focus here should be to 
identify the causal factors for the CCFs and SPOFs of the system. The STPA Handbook indicates that 
causes of UCAs can be grouped into two categories: (1) unsafe controller behaviors; and (2) inadequate 
feedback or other inputs [23].  The two categories are expanded to include some examples: 
 
• Category 1: Failures related to the controller itself (physical failures); inadequate control 
algorithms (the decision-making process may be inappropriate); inadequate process model (the 
controller’s view of the controlled process may be incorrect) [23].   
 
• Category 2: Information/Feedback is not received by the controller; inadequate 
feedback/information is received by the controller; unsafe control input (a controller receives 
an UCA input from another controller) [23].  
 
The categories serve as a starting point for analyzing the results from the previous steps. However, the 
impact of the results of STEP-7 will depend largely on the knowledge and skill of the analysis team for 
determining the details of the causal factors. As each causal factor is identified, efforts can be made to 
evaluate or mitigate them by applying D3 or redesigning the system. The initial efforts in identifying causal 
factors may result in a resource bank of typical causal factors that can be used to expedite future analyses, 
thus reducing the cost of the RESHA over time. 
4. CASE STUDY 
This section describes the hazard analysis of a four-division digital reactor trip system (RTS), which 
has a similar structure to state-of-the-art digital systems in existing NPPs [32]. The analysis follows the 7-
step process outlined in the preceding section. The following is a list of assumptions built into the analysis: 
 
1. All components of the RTS are assumed to be digital, and are therefore susceptible to software 
failures. The reactor trip breakers (RTBs) are an exception; they are assumed to be analog, having 
only hardware failures.  
 
 
4 The addition of probability values can lead to higher order cut sets occurring with greater probability than those of 
lower order. These effects will be investigated as part of the reliability analysis in a future work.  
5 According to NRC interim staff guidance on digital systems, CCFs are not considered single failures [33]. 
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2. The functional of an RTB is controlled by two mechanisms, an undervoltage (UV) trip mechanism 
and a shunt (ST) trip mechanism; the reactor protection system (RPS) activates the UV while the 
diverse protection system (DPS) activates the ST. The main control room (MCR) and the reserve 
shutdown room (RSR) are assumed to have an alternate method that causes the RTBs to open.  
 
3. The MCR and the RSR only need to make a single control action to trip the reactor. They do not 
trip individual divisions.  
 
4. The controller in MCR/RSR is an operator. The UCAs associated with the human controllers are 
added to the FT in the same manner as the UCAs associated with the software failures of digital 
controllers. 
 
5. The number of CCFs in the FT is limited to common failures within a single division, and CCFs 
across all divisions. No CCFs are provided for combinations of divisions. Limiting the 
combinations of CCFs, in the manner specified, simplified the model without removing the most 
significant SPOFs caused by CCFs. Assuming failures had to occur across all divisions ensured 
that the analysis would capture a SPOF of the RPS due to CCFs. Including all other interdivisional 
CCF combinations (e.g., A-B, ABC, CBD, etc.) would provide an increase in cut sets, but is beyond 
the scope of this case study. It is assumed acceptable to ignore the SPOFs due to CCFs within sub-
divisions or modules. 
 
6. RTS component and software diversity is ignored. All components that have identical function are 
assumed to be identical components (i.e., there is no diversity provided in the system). Limiting 
diversity simplifies the identification of CCFs and helps to direct the use of safety features, such as 
diversity, to mitigate CCFs. It should be noted that if diversity is known, it can be included. 
However, the analyst should refer to NUREG/CR-6303, NUREG/CR-7007, NUREG-KM-0009 
and NUREG/CR-5485, as necessary, to make informed decisions regarding the adequacy of 
diversity and where to include CCFs in the FT [11] [12] [17] [18].  
 
7. Each control action (e.g., trip signal) originates from an independent action within the controller 
rather than a single control action that is electrically or physically split to multiple destinations. 
This was done to follow specifically the STPA process, which assumes nothing of the physical 
connections between controllers. This provides the most unbiased controller requirements for 
designers to work with. Decisions regarding how to distribute or duplicate control actions can be a 
point of defense in a system design. STPA allows the designer to make decisions how best to defend 
the system after the fact. The trip signal from the bistable processors (BPs) to individual logic 
processors (LPs) is the one notable exception to this. These connections, not shown in the control 
structure, are assumed to be physically split and distributed to each LP. This simplified the analysis 
from 512 potential UCAs associated with the BPs to 128.  
 
8. No bypassing function, maintenance work, or corrective actions are considered in the analysis. 
 
9. The hazard analysis assumes the RTS is monitoring an NPP operating normally at 100% power, 
with the control rods completely withdrawn and full power to the turbines prior to the anticipated 
operational occurrence (AOO).  
 
10. Individual sensor failures are grouped into one single basic event per division (e.g. division A 
sensor failure).  
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STEP-1: Create a detailed representation of the SOI. 
 
The RTS is responsible for controlling the automatic insertion of reactor control rods into the core to 
bring the nuclear reaction to a shut-down state. For the sake of this hazard analysis, the RTS contains four 
main controllers capable of causing reactor shutdown: (1) the MCR; (2) the RSR; (3) the diverse protection 
system (DPS); and (4) the reactor protection system (RPS). The MCR and the RSR are manual components, 
while the DPS and RPS are automatic. The automatic control elements of the RTS maintain four divisional 
redundancy, while the manual components (assumed for this analysis) have no divisional redundancy. The 
case study is simplified by narrowing the analysis to module-level detail of the RPS and divisional or higher 
resolution for the remaining three parts of the RTS, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Detailed representation of the RTS. 
STEP-2: Develop a FT consisting of the hardware failures for a chosen function of the SOI. 
STEP-2A: The most significant function of the RTS is to trip or scram the reactor by rapidly inserting 
the control rods. The top event selected for the FT is therefore chosen to be that the RTS fails to trip the 
reactor during an AOO, which may be any event that can be anticipated for the reactor requiring shutdown 
via trip or scram.  
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STEP-2B: The FT is assembled based only on the hardware failures of the component of the RTS, 
according to the process described previously. The FT should also include hardware CCF basic events for 
every common or redundant hardware component of the RTS. Figure 7 shows a portion of the hardware-
based FT. Note that the structure also includes the logic indicated by the system sketch.  
 
 
Figure 7. Portion of RTS FT showing hardware-type failures only. The U.S. NRC probabilistic risk 
assessment software SAPHIRE was used to construct the FT [34]. 
STEP-3: Determine UCAs based on a redundancy-guided application of STPA. 
 
STEP-3A: In order to gain a clear understanding of the system, tables of losses and hazardous states 
that can lead to those losses are created. The RTS system is designed to prevent these hazardous states from 
occurring and ultimately prevent the losses in the table. The hazardous states demonstrate system level 
hazards and provide context for UCAs to be identified later. The following tables contain the losses and 
system-level hazards of the RTS.  
 
Table 1: Major losses to be prevented [6] 
L1 Human injury or loss of life 
L2 Environmental contamination 
L3 Equipment damage 
L4 Power generation 
L5 Public perception 
 
Table 2. Hazards which may lead to Losses [6] 
H1 Reactor temperature too high (L1, L2, L3, L4, L5) 
H2 Equipment beyond limits (L1, L2, L3, L4, L5) 
H3 Release of radioactive materials (L1, L2, L5) 
H4 Reactor shutdown (L4, L5) 
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STEP-3B: A redundancy-guided multi-layer control structure is created. Each layer of redundancy in 
the RTS is used to create a control structure diagram. The first layer of the RTS contains the redundancy 
for the trip function across four diverse controlling subsystems: MCR, RSR, DPS, and RPS. The second 
layer of redundancy is found in the multiple divisions of the DPS and the RPS. The next layers of the control 
structure come from the units and modules found in the RPS. The DPS sub-divisional redundancy is ignored 
to simplify the case study. Figure 8 shows the multi-layer control structure for division A. The remaining 
divisions for the case study are identical in format. Each structure indicates control actions and feedback in 
the system. The unknown control actions (CAx in Figure 8) are populated as they are discovered by layer. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Redundancy-guided multi-layer control structure. 
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STEP-3C: The control actions found in each control structure are compiled in a table and analyzed 
according to the four categories of UCAs. Each UCA follows the format provided previously. Table 3 
shows an example of the UCA table. It is assumed that Case D is not applicable as a trip command applied 
too long should not matter during an AOO. Also, it is assumed that a trip command cannot be stopped too 
soon as it is not a continuous controlling action.  
 
Table 3. Examples of UCAs. 
Control Action 
(CA) 
UCAa: CA is 
needed, but not 
given 
UCAb: CA is 
Given, but not 
needed 
UCAc: CA is given 
too early, too late, 
wrong order 
UCAd: CA is 
applied too long or 
stopped too soon 
CA18: DOM-1 
demands SP1 to 
trip the reactor  
UCA18a: DOM-1 
does not provide trip 
command to SP1 
during AOO [H1, 
H2, H3]. 
UCA18b: DOM-1 
provides trip 
command to SP1 
when there is NO 
AOO [H4]. 
UCA18c: DOM-1 
provides trip command 
to SP1 after AOO has 
existed for some time 
[H1, H2, H3]. 
UCA18d:  
Not applicable.  
CA20: 
DOM-3 
demands SP1 to 
trip the reactor 
UCA20a: DOM-3 
does not provide trip 
command to SP1 
during AOO [H1, 
H2, H3]. 
UCA20b: DOM-3 
provides trip 
command to SP1 
when there is NO 
AOO [H4]. 
UCA20c: DOM-3 
provides trip command 
to SP1 after AOO has 
existed for some time 
[H1, H2, H3]. 
UCA20d:  
Not applicable. 
Note: AOO: Anticipated Operational Occurrence; DOM: Digital Output Module; SP: Selective Processor. 
 
STEP-4: Construct an integrated FT by adding applicable UCAs as basic events. 
The top event chosen for this case study is that the RTS fails to trip the reactor during an AOO. Based 
on this assumption, the appropriate UCAs are chosen (types: UCAa and UCAb) to populate the FT with 
software failures. Figure 9 shows the software failures added to the FT and update from Figure 7.  
 
STEP-5: Identify potential software CCFs based on duplicate or redundant UCAs within the FT. 
Within the FT, there are redundant or duplicate control actions that can be used to add additional 
software CCF basic events. The FT in Figure 9 shows the basic events of UCA type A and UCA type C, as 
these were deemed appropriate to add to the FT in the previous step. These UCAs have commonality across 
redundant divisions or units. For example, Division A Selective Processor 1 from Figure 9 is the same 
component as Division A Selective Processor 2 (unit redundancy) and the same component as Division 
B,C, and D Selective Processors (divisional redundancy). Each of these common components can be seen 
in Figure 6. Assuming all of these components are from same manufacturer, with identical software and 
functionality, they have the potential for a CCF. In the FT, under each category for software failures, the 
newly identified CCF events are added. CCFs in this model are assumed to occur within a single division 
and across all divisions. There are no subsets of CCFs between divisions (e.g., A-B, B-C, C-D etc.) Figure 
9 shows the software-based CCFs that have been added to the FT.  
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Figure 9. Portion of FT showing the UV trip failure of RTB A1 with software failures and CCFs added. 
STEP-6 Solve the FT for the minimal cut sets to determine potential SPOFs in the design. 
The minimal cut sets were found using the SAPHIRE software program (the same program used to 
create the FT). In order to evaluate and provide a list of cut sets without having failure data, the cut sets 
were listed and truncated based on order rather than by probability. For this case study, the number of basic 
events contributing to the failure of the top event is limited to a truncation of six or fewer basic events. 
Table 4 contains results for the FT for varying conditions: (1) complete RTS; (2) hardware only failures; 
(3) automatic trip functions only; and (4) RPS only. 
 
 
Table 4. Cut set results. 
Truncation (order) Full RTS model  RTS hardware only Automatic trip only RPS only  
None N/A 15234 N/A N/A 
6 1,184,652 - 4,583,568 N/A 
5 85788 - 1,038,956 328,355 
4 468 - 13,1628 54,899 
3 0 - 9,532 15,283 
2 0 - 52 1,203 
1 0 - 0 13 
 
Based on the information shown in Table 4, only the final column has any SPOFs. This result was 
obtained by ignoring the diversity usually provided by the DPS, RSR, and MCR. Each of these could have 
also been evaluated singularly for SPOFs, but the case study purposefully simplified. Results for the RPS 
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are given in Table 5. There are thirteen total SPOFs—five Hardware-based and eight software-based. All 
of them are due to CCFs (see footnote 5 in Section 3 regarding CCFs and SPOFs). 
 
Table 5: First order cut sets or single points of failure for the RPS system, UV trip only.  
Number Cut set Description 
1 SP-HD-CCF Selective processor hardware CCF. 
2 LC-DOM-HD-CCF Logic cabinet digital output module hardware CCF. 
3 RTB-UV-HD-CCF Reactor trip breaker undervoltage hardware CCF. 
4 LC-BP-HD-CCF Logic bistable processor hardware CCF.  
5 LC-LP-HD-CCF Logic cabinet logic processor hardware CCF 
6 LC-LP-SF-CCF-TA Logic cabinet logic processor software CCF type A. 
7 LC-LP-SF-CCF-TC Logic cabinet logic processor software CCF type C. 
8 LC-DOM-SF-CCF-TA Logic cabinet digital output module software CCF type A. 
9 LC-DOM-SF-CCF-TC Logic cabinet digital output module software CCF type C. 
10 SP-SF-CCF-TA Selective processor software CCF type A. 
11 SP-SF-CCF-TC Selective processor software CCF type C. 
12 LC-BP-SF-CCF-TA Logic cabinet bistable processor software CCF type A. 
13 LC-BP-SF-CCF-TC Logic cabinet bistable processor software CCF type C. 
 
STEP-7: Identify and provide guidance to eliminate triggers of critical failures in the design including 
CCFs and SPOFs.  
 
The focus of this section is on the CCFs and SPOFs of the system. However, these techniques can be 
applied to any event of interest found in the cut set lists. The idea is to provide possible sources for their 
failure. The STPA Handbook indicates that the causes of UCAs can be grouped into two categories: (1) 
unsafe controller behaviors; and (2) inadequate feedback and/or other inputs [23]. Hardware-based failures 
are reasonably understood due largely because of industry experience [35]. Identifying causal factors for 
these failures is therefore based on historical failure-rate data. For software-based failures, the analysis can 
be more challenging and requires the researcher to consider the possible causes of unsafe controller 
behavior or inadequate feedback. The following is an example of these two categories applied to one of the 
software CCFs found in Table 5. Specifically, the chosen basic event is LC-BP-SF-CCF-TC (i.e., Logic 
Cabinet Bistable Processor CCF of Software Type C) corresponding to the failure of all the BPs to provide 
a trip command to each the logic cabinet of each division too late during an AOO.  
 
• Causal factors due to category 1: unsafe controller behavior: 
 
Scenario: The nuclear reactor experiences an event meriting a reactor trip/scram. During this time, 
the BP should recognize the status of the plant and demand the reactor to trip. Processing delays 
within the BP result in the control action occurring too late. Software engineers should provide 
guidance as to the causes of processing delays, because shared software can lead to a potential CCF. 
 
• Causal factor due to category 2: inadequate feedback 
 
Scenario: A BP may experience failure due to a lack of adequate feedback from the plant leading 
to the BP having an incorrect view of the status of the plant. For example, the BP relies on steam 
generator pressure information. This signal for steam generator pressure may be corrupt or 
incorrect, resulting in the BP failing to act appropriately. The BP may “think” the system is at an 
appropriate pressure and do nothing for some time before the pressure reaches a value 
corresponding to what the BP “thinks” is necessary to trip the reactor. Based on the assumption 
that all BPs have the same software, this would result in a CCF of the system. Of course, the CCF 
originates in faulty sensors, but also extends to the control action of the BPs and the subsequent 
UCA.   
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• Guidance for these two scenarios: 
 
For the first scenario regarding software processing delays, the use of diverse software processing 
as part of D3 may help at reduce the risk of having all controllers fail commonly. Thus, eliminating 
the risk of CCF even if the single failure mode still might occur. However, with a system that has 
multiple layers of redundancy and diversity, such as this RTS system, there will always be at least 
four diverse ways to shut down/trip/scram the reactor. Based on having four means to trip the 
reactor at the highest level make this system design, from a purely qualitative standpoint, relatively 
safe. 
 
For the second scenario, the proper use of D3 will help eliminate the common failure potential of 
shared software and hardware. In addition, the use of proper procedural testing and maintenance 
can ensure that the sensors will provide correct information to the BP. Diversity in sensor 
measurements can also help to ensure safety by providing a backup source of feedback to the BP. 
Both processes are already commonly employed by the NRC and industry. See NUREG/CR-6303, 
NUREG/CR-7007, NUREG-KM-0009 and NUREG/CR-5485 to make informed decisions 
regarding the adequacy of diversity and where to include CCFs in the FT [11] [12] [17] [18]. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
This paper has demonstrated an approach in the application of STPA and FTA for hazard analysis, as 
well as the identification of potential CCFs, SPOFs, and their causal factors. The treatment of redundancy 
by STPA was altered, making the capture of redundant features the central focus in both the creation of the 
control structure and the analysis of the UCAs. STPA was combined with FTA in a redundancy-guided 
way to provide insight to the relationships and failure modes of the digital RTS. RESHA identified 196 
UCAs which resulted in 1,184,652 cut sets truncated to the sixth order. Future work will quantitatively 
refine the cut sets based on probability values. For now, these results can be qualitatively refined and 
grouped by specific subsections of the RTS. For the RPS, qualitative results indicated a total of thirteen 
potential CCFs. Determination of the triggers of these most critical hazards were discussed with a couple 
examples in the preceding section. It is recognized that a multidisciplinary team is needed in order to 
identify all relevant triggers. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
This work has provided a means to overcome technical challenges faced by the nuclear industry for the 
implementation of digital I&C systems. In particular, RESHA provided a means to identify software-based 
interactions and potential CCFs in highly redundant, state-of-the-art digital I&C systems, by fully 
incorporating redundancy into the hazard analysis process. Embracing redundancy in the analysis allowed 
the work to meet its objectives in three ways: (1) this work defines a step-by-step approach for the hazard 
analysis of digital systems, that can help engineers efficiently make design and risk mitigation decisions by 
providing them a means to systematically identify the most critical CCFs and hazards of digital I&C 
systems; (2) RESHA identifies the critical hazards of a system, allowing utilities to effectively manage the 
cost of safety-rated digital I&C by strategically eliminating unnecessary design features; (3) RESHA 
provides a technical basis for reliability analysis by identifying crucial failure modes and qualitatively 
determining their effects on system vulnerability. Ultimately, RESHA helps improve the design of highly 
redundant digital I&C through a detailed qualitative hazard analysis.  
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